Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 52

Issue 2

Article 3

1986

DOT's Show Cause Order 86-1-38: A Case Study of An
Overzealous Government Effort to Expand United States
Jurisdiction over Foreign Air Carriers
Roy J. Rafols

Recommended Citation
Roy J. Rafols, DOT's Show Cause Order 86-1-38: A Case Study of An Overzealous Government Effort to
Expand United States Jurisdiction over Foreign Air Carriers, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 353 (1986)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol52/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

DOT'S SHOW CAUSE ORDER 86-1-38: A CASE
STUDY OF AN OVERZEALOUS GOVERNMENT
EFFORT TO EXPAND UNITED STATES
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN AIR
CARRIERS
RoY J.

RAFOLS*

INTRODUCTION

0

N DECEMBER 4, 1984, Kuwait Airways Flight 221
from Kuwait City, Kuwait to Karachi, Pakistan was hijacked over international waters by a group of men armed
with hand grenades and pistols. Aboard Flight 221 were,
among others, Mr. Charles F. Hegna and Mr. William L.
Stanford. Both were American citizens employed by the
Agency for International Development ("AID") of the
United States Department of State. The hijackers forced
the Kuwait Airways' airplane to land at Teheran, Iran
where Messrs. Hegna and Stanford were killed by the
hijackers.'
* B.S.C., De La Salle University, Philippines, 1978; LL.B., Ateneo de Manila
University, Philippines, 1984; LL.M (International and Comparative Law), Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C., 1986. Mr. Rafols is associated with the law firm of Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De Los Angeles,
Manila, Philippines. He is presently an exchange associate at Crowell & Moring,
Washington, D.C.
The author wishes to acknowledge Professors Allan I. Mendelsohn and Jeffrey
Shane of Georgetown University Law Center for whose seminar course this paper
was originally prepared. The author is especially grateful to Professor Mendelsohn whose criticisms, suggestions, and assistance have made this publication
possible.
I Motion of Lorraine P. Stanford, Executrix, and Edwena R. Hegna, Executrix,
to Revoke or Suspend the Exemption of Kuwait Airways Corporation at 8, Application of Kuwait Airways Corporation for an Exemption from Section 402 of the
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At the time of the hijacking, Messrs. Hegna and Stanford were travelling by order of the United States on diplomatic passports, fulfilling their duties to supervise the
auditing of various AID transactions with Middle Eastern
nations. Messrs. Hegna and Stanford acquired their tickets from Northwest Orient and Pan American World Airways, both United States carriers. The tickets were issued
(in exchange for United States travel receipts) on AID
premises in Sanaa, Yemen and Karachi, Pakistan. Kuwait
Airways was the carrier for a portion of both men's trips
pursuant to Kuwait Airways' participation in an Interline
Traffic Passenger Agreement ("Agreement") with Pan
American. The Agreement allowed the United States carrier to issue tickets for transportation over the routes of
Kuwait Airways and provided for a division of the fares
received. 2
On January 18, 1985, Lorraine P. Stanford, as executrix
of William L. Stanford's estate, sued Kuwait Airways in
the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York seeking damages for alleged acts and omissions of Kuwait Airways in connection with her husband's
death. Edwena Hegna, as executrix of Charles F. Hegna's
estate, filed a similar lawsuit on March 29, 1985, in the
same court. Relying on two arguments, Kuwait Airways
filed motions to dismiss in both actions. First, Kuwait
Airways contended that article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention ("Convention") 4 precludes United States Government employees injured or killed while travelling abroad
on foreign carriers from bringing suit in the United States
against the foreign air carrier. Article 28(1) operates,
moreover, notwithstanding that the individuals were on
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (No. 38,066) (Department of Transportation, June 7, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Motion].
2 Id. at 8-9.
3 Id. at 10. Kuwait Airways filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id.
4 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International
Transportation by Air, openedfor signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.I.A.S.
No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Warsaw Convention].
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official United States Government business when they
were killed, and the foreign carrier had a place of business
in the United States and operated air services to the
United States under and pursuant to Civil Aeronautics
Board ("CAB") authority. Second, Kuwait Airways asserted that, as an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign, it
was immune from suit in United States courts under the
provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 ("FSIA"). 5 Specifically, Kuwait Airways maintained
that although the exemption authority by which the CAB
authorized Kuwait Airways to operate to and from the
United States provides for waivers of sovereign immunity,
that waiver relates only to actions "based upon any claim
arising out of operations" pursuant to the exemption. 6
Because Kuwait Airways' operations in the Middle East,
out of which the two actions arose, were not operations to
and from the United States, under the exemption the
waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply.7
In response to these two defenses, Lorraine P. Stanford
and Edwena Hegna filed a motion with the Department of
Transportation ("DOT") to apprise the DOT of Kuwait
Airways' defenses and to seek revocation or suspension of
the exemption authority granted by the CAB to Kuwait
Airways. 8 Alternatively, the plaintiffs requested that the
DOT modify the exemption. 9 Stanford and Hegna believed that a modification of the exemption was needed in
order to guard the public's safety and to ensure that
American passengers, who travel on foreign airlines that
do business in the United States, have access to American
courts. 10
5 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1982).
o See Plaintiffs' Motion, supra note 1, at 28. For the entire text of the waiver
which the United States generally grants to foreign carriers, see infra text accompanying note 16.
7 See Plaintiffs' Motion, supra note 1, at 28.
8 See id.at 1, 37.
9Id. at 38.
toId. Specifically, the motion asked the CAB "to modify the exemption granted
to Kuwait Airways in order to guard the safety and rights of the public, and to
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On January 21, 1986, the DOT issued a Show Cause
Order" directing all interested persons to show cause
why the DOT should not amend all foreign airline operating authority.' 2 The proposed amendment would clarify
that the required waiver of sovereign immunity extends to
all the air service operations of a foreign carrier, regardless of whether those activities take place within foreign
air transportation as defined in the Federal Aviation Act.' 3
Further, the "proposed action" supposedly only clarifies
the scope of a condition currently imposed on foreign air
carriers' operations.' 4 The DOT contends that its proposal is not intended to affect any other aspect of a foreign
airline's operations, including the airline's right to raise
jurisdictional arguments and other legal defenses. 15
Under current practices every foreign air carrier that
operates to or from the United States is required, as part
of its section 402 foreign air carrier permit (or, as here, its
exemption authority), to waive the defense of sovereign
immunity under the following express terms:
[The holder shall] [w]aive any right it may possess to assert any defense of sovereign immunity from suit in any
action or proceeding instituted against it in any court or
other tribunal in the United States (or its territories or
possessions) based upon any claim arising out of operations under this [permit or exemption].' 6
The DOT fears this exact wording makes it possible to
argue that the CAB intended to limit the waiver to claims
arising out of a carrier's operations to and from the
ensure access to our Nation's courts for American citizens who travel on foreign

airlines that do business in the United States." Id.
11Order to Show Cause, Amendment of Foreign Air Carrier Permit and Exemption Authority, Department of Transportation, No. 43,742 (proposedJan. 21,
1986) [hereinafter cited as Show Cause Order].
12 Id. at 1.
,sId. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1542 (1982).
For the Federal Aviation Act's definition of "overseas air commerce" or "foreign
air commerce," see infra note 28.
14 Show Cause Order, supra note 11, at 1.
I ld.

Id. at 2 & n.3 (citing DOT orders 85-11-5, 85-9-15, 85-9-21, 85-9-22).

19861

SHOW CAUSE ORDER

357

United States.' 7 The DOT asserts that such a narrow in18
terpretation would be contrary to the CAB's intent.
The CAB specifically intended foreign carriers, like domestic air carriers, to have no sovereign immunity defense.1 9 Therefore, the DOT proposes to amend the
standard waiver conditions to read as follows:
[The holder shall] [w]aive any right it may possess to assert any defense of sovereign immunity from suit in any
action or proceeding instituted against it in any court or
other tribunal in the United States (or its territories or
possessions) based upon any claim arising out of operations by the holder of this [permit or exemption] .20
This paper will address the following reasons why the
proposed action by the DOT is unlawful. First, the present waiver is clear and does not require any "clarification." Second, the proposed action exceeds the scope of
the DOT's authority. Third, the proposal is contrary to
the avowed United States public policy as expressed in the
FSIA. Finally, the proposed action will run counter to
constitutional safeguards enunciated by United States
courts.
I.

THE PRESENT WAIVER IS CLEAR AND DOES NOT
REQUIRE ANY CLARIFICATION

As previously stated, the DOT contends that the proposed action merely clarifies the scope of the current
waiver. 2 ' Presumably, the DOT fears that "the exact
words of the condition make it possible to argue that the
17 Show
18 Id.

Cause Order, supra note 11, at 2.

- Id. The Show Cause Order quoted "El-Al" Israel Airlines Ltd., 14 C.A.B.
962 (1951). In El-Al the CAB stated: "As a matter of policy.., proper protection
of shippers and the traveling public require that insofar as practicable a foreign air
carrier shall not enjoy immunity from suit any more than does a domestic carrier."
El-Al, 14 C.A.B. at 964.
Show Cause Order, supra note 11, at 5 (emphasis added to indicate proposed
change).
21 Id. at '1. In its show cause order the DOT stated: "The proposed action is
limited to clarifying the scope of a condition currently imposed on the operations
of foreign air carriers, and is not intended to affect any other aspect of a foreign
20
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CAB intended that the waiver should be limited to claims
arising out of a carrier's operations to and from the
United States made possible as a result of the permit or
exemption. ' 2 2 Contrary to the DOT's view, the present
waiver needs no clarification. The language of the present waiver unequivocally states that the waiver applies
only to claims arising out of operations under the permit
or exemption, that is, to claims arising under air transport
activities in the United States."
Such a "narrow" construction finds support in the
records of the CAB hearing in which the present waiver
was adopted. In that hearing, counsel for the CAB Bureau of Air Operations, V. Rock Grundman, Esq., clarified
the scope of the waiver:
Q Now . . .undoubtedly a question might arise as to
immunity from suit of the Israel El Al, as a government
agency, on any matters arising in the United States, and
we, in such cases, have been asking every airline recently,
within the last year, I would say, whether or not it would
accept a condition in its permit to the effect that the carrier will accept jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States in connection with matters arising out of its air transport
activities in the United States.
In other words, that in the ordinary commercial activities it would not claim immunity from suit because of the
governmental character of its ownership.
Are you in a position to state whether or not El Al will
accept such a condition in its permit?
A. Well, I am afraid that I would have to refer this matter
to headquarters but I would assume that El Al would be
ready to sign an admission like this.
Q The point is, such a defense has been raised in the
case of one international airline and inasmuch as it is just a
purely commercial activity it would seem it would be reasonable it should be subject to suits in the ordinary course
carrier's operations, including its
right to raise other legal defenses, such as jurisdictional arguments." Id.
22 Id. at 2.
2.1See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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of events in matters arising in the United States -just a waiver
of that one defense.24
The CAB wanted, and El Al agreed, to waive sovereign
immunity "in connection with matters arising out of its air
transport activities in the United States,"' 25 or, as reiterated, "in matters arising in the United States. ' 26 Even if
the waiver can be interpreted broadly to include all El Al's
"air transportation" activities, including its "foreign air
transportation" activities, the waiver still would not contemplate an extension to all El Al operations everywhere
in the world. Thus, for example, the waiver clearly did
not contemplate allowing suit in United States court by an
Israeli national ticketed only, and then injured, on an El
Al flight between Tel Aviv and Athens. Nor did the
waiver necessarily contemplate requiring El Al to waive its
immunity even for a United States citizen if, for example,
the United States citizen was ticketed only, and then injured, on an El Al flight between Paris and Tel Aviv.
II.

THE PROPOSED ACTION EXCEEDS THE SCOPE OF THE
DOT's AUTHORITY

First, the proposed action exceeds the DOT's authority
to regulate foreign air transportation. The Federal Aviation Act of 195827 ("Act") defines "foreign air commerce"
or "overseas commerce" as carriage by aircraft of persons
or property in commerce for compensation between a
place in the United States and any place outside the
United States. 28 By its proposed action the DOT seeks to
24 Record at 35-36, "El-Al" Israel Airlines Ltd., 14 C.A.B. 962 (1951) (emphasis
added).
25
26
27
2"

Id. at 35.

Id.
49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1542 (1982).
Id. § 1301(23)(c). This section states:
"[O]verseas air commerce", and "foreign air commerce" ... mean
the carriage by aircraft of persons and property for compensation or
hire, or the carriage of mail by aircraft, or the operation or navigation of aircraft in the conduct or furtherance of a business or vocation, in commerce between ...
place outside thereof....

a place in the United States and any
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clarify that foreign air carriers may not seek sovereign immunity in United States tribunals for their air service activities, regardless of whether those activities took place
within or outside foreign air transportation.29 Clearly, the
DOT's proposed action which seeks to regulate air transportation having no nexus with the United States is beyond the scope of the DOT's statutory authority.
However laudable the DOT's proposal, the DOT, like its
predecessor the CAB, was created by Congress, and the
"determinative question" is what Congress has said the
DOT can do rather than what the DOT thinks it should
0
3

do.

Second, the proposed action exceeds the scope of the
DOT's authority because the proposed action is inconsistent with the treaty obligations of the United States under
the Warsaw Convention .3 Specifically, the proposed action is inconsistent with article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention as the proposal seeks, in effect, a unilateral
expansion of the permissible jurisdictions under which
suit may be brought against a foreign air carrier. Under
the proposed action a foreign air carrier may be sued in a
United States court even if the claimant, as in the case of
Hegna and Stanford, purchased his ticket abroad and his
ticketed transportation was between two foreign points.3 2
Id.29 Show Cause Order, supra note 11, at 5.
so See Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 322 (1961).
The Court stated: "[The Civil Aeronautics Board] is entirely a creature of Congress and the determinative question is not what the Board thinks it should do but
what Congress has said it can do." Id.
"1 See generally Warsaw Convention, supra note 4. The Federal Aviation Act requires that
[i]n exercising and performing their powers and duties under this
chapter, the Board and the Secretary of Transportation shall do so
consistently with any obligation assumed by the United States in any
treaty, convention, or agreement that may be in force between the
United States and any foreign country or foreign countries. ...
49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982). Cf Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 446 U.S. 243, 276 n.5 (1984) (Stevens J., dissenting) ("[T]he powers delegated to the CAB, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 .... must be exercised consistently with any
convention in force, including the Warsaw Convention.").
32 Show Cause Order, supra note 11, at 2.
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In short, this is exactly the kind of suit not encompassed
within the jurisdictional fora allowed by Warsaw's article
8. Clearly, therefore, such a unilateral expansion by the
DOT would run counter to the treaty obligations of the
United States under the Warsaw Convention.
Finally, a proposal to expand the permissible jurisdictional fora under article 28 has been made under article
XII of the 1971 Guatemala Protocol. 4 But, the United
States Senate failed to ratify the Guatemala Protocol.3 A
mere agency, such as the DOT, cannot achieve on its own
that which the Senate, in the treaty process, expressly
rejected.
III.

THE PROPOSED ACTION IS CONTRARY TO THE
AVOWED UNITED STATES PUBLIC POLICY As
EXPRESSED IN THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976

When Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immu3 Warsaw Convention, supra note 4, art. 28(1). Article 28(1) provides:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of plaintiff, in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before
the court of domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court
at the place of destination....

ld.

4 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certin Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as
amended by the Protocol at the Hague on 28 September 1955, openedfor signature
Mar. 8, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 613 [hereinafter cited as Guatemala Protocol]. Article XII
of the Guatemala Protocol states in part:
In Article 28 of the Convention the present paragraph 2 shall be
renumbered as paragraph 3 and a new paragraph 2 shall be inserted
as follows:
"2. In respect of damage resulting from the death, injury or delay of a passenger or the destruction, loss, damage or delay of baggage, the action may be brought before one of the Courts
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article, or in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties, before the Court within the jurisdiction of which the carrier has an establishment if the passenger has
his domicile or permanent residence in the territory of the Same
High Contracting party."
Id.
.5 129 CONG. REc. S2279 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (Senate vote declining to
ratify Montreal Protocols which incorporate Guatemala Protocol).
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nities Act of 1976,36 Congress clearly expressed its legislative intent. First, Congress intended the FSIA to be the
"sole and exclusive" standard for resolving sovereign immunity questions raised by foreign states before United
States courts. 7 The DOT's proposed action will run
counter to this legislative intent because the proposed action subjects a foreign air carrier's waiver of sovereign immunity to the DOT's own standards, not the standards set
forth under the FSIA.
The DOT's show cause order clearly manifests that the
DOT's standards run counter to those of the FSIA. In its
show cause order the DOT states that its action "does not
reflect any position on the propriety of asserting any other
defense to which a foreign air carrier may be legally entitled, including jurisdictional defenses13 8 and that it is not
"deciding whether the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act would otherwise exclude foreign air
39
carriers from the general grant of sovereign immunity.1
The above-quoted statements clearly show the DOT's
misunderstanding of the FSIA. The FSIA is a jurisdictional statute, and under section 1330 subject matter jurisdiction hinges on whether the foreign state is entitled
to assert immunity under sections 1605 through 1607 or
under any applicable international agreement.40 One of
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1982).
H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6610 [hereinafter cited as House Report]. The
House Report states:
This bill, entitled the "Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,"
sets forth the sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of
sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State
courts in the United States. It is intended to preempt any other State or
Federal law (excluding applicable international agreements) for according immunity to foreign sovereigns, their political subdivisions,
their agencies, and their instrumentalities.
Id. (emphasis added).
" Show Cause Order, supra note 11, at 5.
, Id.
40 Section 1330(a) of the FSIA provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign
state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for
.7
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the general exceptions under section 1605(a) of the FSIA
is an explicit or implied waiver. 4 ' Thus, were a foreign air
carrier to waive sovereign immunity as to all its operations, whether or not the basis of the action has any connection with the United States, the result may be more
than a mere waiver of a "jurisdictional defense." The
waiver could be construed as a submission by the foreign
air carrier to the jurisdiction of the United States courts,
even under circumstances in which the claim is based on
facts having no connection with the United States.4 2
Thus, contrary to the DOT's assertion, any such waiver
almost certainly will bar the foreign air carrier from asserting any other jurisdictional defenses. In effect, and
contrary to the DOT's avowals, a foreign air carrier executing, or being required to execute, the proposed waiver
will not be on an equal footing with private entrepreneurs
engaged in the same activities. Clearly, private entrepreneurs would be entitled to invoke the jurisdictional defense that a cause of action has an insufficient nexus with
the United States, such that the action can not be brought
in a United States court.
Second, the proposed show cause order is contrary to
United States public policy as expressed in the FSIA because one of Congress' primary objectives in enacting the
FSIA was to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign imrelief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or
under any applicable international agreement.
28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1982).
41 Section 1605(a) of the FSIA states in pertinent part:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case-(l) in which the
foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign
state may purport to effect in accordance with the terms of the
waiver....

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982).
42 See De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1389 (5th Cir.
1985). The court stated: "Unlike the act of state doctrine, sovereign immunity is

not merely a defense on the merits-it is jurisdictional in nature. If sovereign
immunity exists, then the court lacks both personal and subject matter jurisdiction
to hear the case and must enter an order of dismissal." Id. (citations omitted).
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munity.4 3 In order to achieve this, Congress placed the
question of determining sovereign immunity entirely in
the hands of the courts, as a matter of law, as opposed to
an executive agency, as a matter of policy. 44 Thus, the
Congress stated: "It is also designed to bring U.S. practice into conformity with that of most other nations by
leaving sovereign immunity decisions exclusively to the courts,
thereby discontinuing the practice ofjudicial deference 'to
'suggestions of immunity' from the executive branch. 45
The DOT's proposed action clearly runs counter to this
policy because the proposal will cause the involvement
and intervention of the DOT, an agency of the executive
branch, on the question of sovereign immunity-the very
thing Congress intended to discontinue.
Third, the DOT's action contradicts the FSIA's policy

of deferring to the Warsaw Convention when the FSIA
and the Convention conflict. Under the Warsaw Convention, a foreign air carrier may be sued only in the jurisdictions set out in article 28(1).46 Thus, for all practical
purposes, the Convention bestows on foreign air carriers
immunity from jurisdiction in cases not covered by article
28(1). 4 7 Under the provisions of section 1330(a) of the
43 Under the restrictive theory of soverign immunity, a sovereign is immune for
its sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) but not for its private acts (juregestionis).
Letter of Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate, to the Department of Justice (May
19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984, 984 (1952).
44 See Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983).
The Supreme Court stated:
In 1976, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in
order to free the Government from the case-by-case diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing standards and to "assur[e] litigants
that.., decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process," H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, p. 7

Id.

(1976). To accomplish these objectives, the Act contains a comprehensive set of legal standards governing claims of immunity in every
civil action against a foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.

4.5House Report, supra note 37, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, at 6610.
46 For the text of article 28(1), see supra note 33.
47 Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 802 (2d Cir. 1971). Cf
McKenry,Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention, 29J. AIR L. & CoM. 205, 216-18
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FSIA, such immunity denies district courts subject matter
jurisdiction over cases not covered by article 28(1).48 Section 1604 of the FSIA restates this legislative intent:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act
a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.49
The legislative history of the FSIA clearly shows that article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention takes precedence
over any waiver of immunity contemplated under the
FSIA: "All immunity provisions in sections 1604 through
1607 are made subject to 'existing' treaties and other international agreements to which the United States is a
party. In the event an internationalagreement expressly conflicts
with this bill, the international agreement would control.' '50
Thus, the DOT's proposal, which seeks to set aside the
limitations on permissible jurisdiction contained in article
28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, runs counter to the legislative intent expressed in the FSIA that any international
agreement to which the United States is a party shall take
precedence on questions of immunity.
Lastly, the proposed action could result in a situation in
which a foreign air carrier may be forced to defend itself
in a United States court against aforeign plaintiff alleging a
cause of action based on occurrences in a foreign country
with absolutely no connection with the United States. The
drafters of the FSIA considered, and clearly intended to
avoid, such a situation. The drafters did not want the
FSIA to turn United States courts into "small interna(1963) (a court in a jurisdiction which does not fall within the contacts of article
28 will (or should) dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction).
4" See Gayda v. LOT Polish Airlines, 702 F.2d 424, 425 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Because article 28 speaks to subject matter jurisdiction, it operates as an absolute bar
to federal jurisdiction in cases falling outside its terms..."). See also In re Korean
Airlines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 19 Av. CAS. (CCH) 17,578 (D.D.C. 1985). For
the text of section 1330(a), see supra note 40.
41) 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982).
-o House Report, supra note 37, at 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE. CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, at 6616 (emphasis added).
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tional courts of claims." Rather, Congress intended the
FSIA only to cover disputes which have a relation to the
United States. 5 '

IV.

THE PROPOSED ACTION WILL RUN COUNTER TO
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS ENUNCIATED BY
UNITED STATES COURTS

The DOT's proposed waiver assumes that
the public interest, and U.S. international aviation policy,
demand that foreign air carriers owned by foreign governments waive any claims they may otherwise enjoy to claim
sovereign immunity in U.S. courts, whether or not the particular air service activity complained of takes place between the United States and some foreign place, or
between two foreign places. 52
The DOT apparently contemplates making governmentowned foreign air carriers subject to the jurisdiction of
United States courts regardless of whether the action has
any United States nexus. This raises serious constitutional
questions, particularly probable violations of the due process clause.
In his landmark decision in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,53 Chief Justice Stone stated quite clearly that
due process requires that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
5'See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R.
11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1976) (statement of Bruno A. Ristau, chief of the Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Division, Dept. ofJustice) (emphasis added). Specifically, Mr. Ristau states:
It should also be stressed that the long-arm feature of the bill will
insure that "only those disputes which have a relation to the United
States are litigated in the courts of the United States and that our
courts are not turned into small international courts of claim". The
bill is not designed to open up our courts to all comers to litigate
any dispute which any private party may have with a foreign state
anywhere in the world.

Id.

.52
Show Cause Order, supra note 11, at 2.
- 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial
' 54

justice.

The minimum contacts requirement enunciated by the
Supreme Court in International Shoe was reiterated and
confirmed in the Supreme Court case of Shaffer v. Heitner.55 In that case the Court concluded that the International Shoe standards apply to all assertions of jurisdiction
in a state court.56 Thus, the Court denied jurisdiction in a
quasi in rem action when the property serving as the basis
for state court jurisdiction was completely unrelated to
the plaintiff's cause of action.
Although Shaffer can be distinguished from the present
controversy in that this case involves a proposed waiver,
rather than the presence of property, as the basis for jurisdiction, the district court in the recent case of Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,5 citing Shaffer
and other InternationalShoe descendants,5 9 refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Iranian defendants despite the waiver of sovereign immunity clause in the
United States-Iran Treaty of Amity. 60 The court stated:
Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
- 433 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1977).
58 Id. at 212. The court stated, "[A]I1 assertions of state court jurisdiction must
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny." Id. (footnote omitted).
57

Id. at 209. The Court stated:

Thus, although the presence of the defendant's property in a State
might suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the
State, and the litigation, the presence of the property alone would
not support the State's jurisdiction. If those other ties did not exist, cases
over which the State is now thought to have jurisdictioncould not be brought in
thatforum.
Id. (emphasis added).
58 506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
59The InternationalShoe descendants include: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); and Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437 (1952).
- Chicago Bridge, 506 F.Supp. at 984-87. See Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights Between the United States of America and Iran, Aug.
15, 1955, United States-Iran, art. XI, § 4, 8 U.S.T. 899, 909, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
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[T]here is a more fundamental objection to the exercise of
personal jurisdiction on the basis of a waiver of sovereign
immunity. In light of Shaffer v. Heitner, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, and other International Shoe descendants, we believe the fiction of implied consent cannot obviate
the need for establishingminimum contacts with a forum ....

... We are not the first court to question the use of
waiver as a substitute for due process fairness in the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns....
It is to be noted that the "primary" purpose of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 was to strip foreign states of their immunity from suit when they engaged
in private commercial conduct, thereby placing them on
the same footing as non-governmental entities ....Elimi-

nating the need to establish personal jurisdiction over
those governmental enterprises, however, through6 the
fic1
tion of consent puts them in a far worse position.
Finally, in Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria62 the
Supreme Court mentioned, but did not decide, the issue
of whether "by waiving its immunity, a foreign state could
consent to suit based on activities wholly unrelated to the

United States."' 63 The Court noted that the FSIA appar-

ently does not affect the forum non conveniens doctrine. 64
Presumably, the court was implying that the requirement
of minimum contacts with the forum state must be met.
These constitutional guidelines have been recognized
by Congress, and, in its enactment of the FSIA, consistency with such constitutional guidelines was clearly intended.65 It is thus incumbent upon the DOT, in
exercising its powers and authority to regulate foreign air
transportation, to comply with such constitutional guidelines consistent with congressional policy.
o,Chicago Bridge, 506 F.Supp. at 985-87 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
12

461 U.S. 480 (1983).

n.,
Id. at 490, n.15.
I/d.
"

House Report, supra note 37, at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
at 6612.
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CONCLUSION

It would be imprudent for the DOT to adopt the proposed action of revising and expanding the waiver of sovereign immunity presently contained in the operating
authorities of all foreign air carriers. Although the DOT
may mean well, nevertheless, the DOT has no statutory
authority to adopt its proposed action. The answer to the
DOT's concern clearly is congressional action on the matter. The more prudent move for the DOT, therefore,
would be to propose a revision of the FSIA and/or the
adoption of the Guatemala or Montreal Protocols.66

1' It is an interesting question whether United States ratification of the Guatemala Protocol with its article XII expansion of Warsaw's article 28 jurisdiction
would ipso facto give United States courts jurisdiction over all cases that are not
now subject to United States jurisdiction but that would be covered by the DOT's
proposed expansion. Ratification of the Guatemala Protocol, however, most likely
would permit suit in the United States in circumstances, as here, involving two
United States Government employees while on official business abroad--even
though they purchased their tickets abroad, the tickets involved only two foreign
points, and the injury occurred aboard a foreign carrier.

